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COMES NOW the defendant and respondent Sandra G. Williams
(defendant), by and through her attorney, Lynn P. Heward, and
submits this Answer to Petition for Rehearing pursuant to the
request of the Court and in accordance with Rule 35 of the Rules
of the Utah Court of Appeals.
THE TRIAL COURT PROVIDED SUFFICIENT EXPLANATION OF ITS RULING
In its "Supplemental Motion to Reconsider," plaintiff
contends that Rule 4 K b ) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
mandates Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law when there is an
involuntary dismissal. A careful reading of this rule reveals
that such is not the case.
Rule 4 K b ) reads as follows:
For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute
or to comply with these rules or any order of
court, a defendant may move for dismissal of
an action or of any claim against him. After
the plaintiff, in an action tried by the court
without a jury, has completed the presentation
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of his evidence the defendant, without waiving
his right to offer evidence in the event the
motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal
on the ground that upon the facts and the law
the plaintiff has shown no right to relief.
The court as trier of the facts may then
determine them and render judgment against the
plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment
until the close of all the evidence. If the
court renders judgment on the merits against
the plaintiff, the court shall make findings
as provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the court
in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies,
a dismissal under this subdivision and any
dismissal not provided for in this rule,
other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction
or for improper venue or for lack of an indispensable party, operates as an adjudication
upon the merits. [Emphasis added.]
It is clear from the context of this rule that the Court
need only make findings when it grants defendant's motion to
dismiss at trial upon the close of plaintiff's case in chief.

In

the instant matter, the case never went to trial; there was no
evidentiary hearing.
An example of a case where the Rule 4 K b ) mandate for
findings applied was Davis v. Payne and Day, Inc., 10 Utah 2d 53,
348 P.2d 337 (1960).

There the trial court, sitting without a

jury, failed to make "findings of fact as authorized by Rule
4 K b ) U.R.C.P." upon granting defendant's motion to dismiss after
hearing plaintiff's evidence.
In that case, the Supreme Court did not automatically
reverse, but rather considered the evidence in the light most
favorable to him.

Here, plaintiff argues, and rightfully so, that

in any event this Court must have the evidence considered in the
light most favorable to it anyway insofar as the review of this
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matter is considered analogous to a review of the granting of
Summary Judgment.
A case where the Appellate Court was recently reviewing
a Summary Judgment is quite helpful in this regard.

In Taylor

v. Estate of Grant Taylor, 102 U.A.R. 36 (Utah App. 1989) the
trial court ruled that a document was invalid and assessed attorney's
fees against the plaintiff.

The trial court's order did not specify

the legal basis for the award nor how the court arrived at the
amount assessed.
The Taylor court stated on pages 38 to 39:
At the outset, we note that findings of fact
are unnecessary in connection with summary
judgment decisions.
...

[T]he material facts aref by definition,
undisputed and there are no facts which the
court has to find.
The decision went on to show that there were no disputes
with respect to the material facts.

It then addressed on page 39

the problem created by an absence in the record of the trial
judge's legal basis for awarding attorney's fees:
However, to affirm this award we must also
conclude, in light of the undisputed facts,
that a legal basis exists for the award. Our
task is complicated somewhat by the fact that
the exact legal basis the court had in mind in
awarding fees does not appear in the court's
judgment. No transcript was made of the
hearing during which the issue of fees was
argued, nor is there a written memorandum
informing this court and the parties of the
trial court's legal view of the matter.
However, it is appropriate that we affirm if
the trial court's decision can be sustained on
any proper legal basis.
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The Court went on to determine that the undisputed facts
legally supported the ruling on the validity of the document and
formed a sufficient basis for the trial court's discretion to
grant attorney's fees.

However, only Rule 11 seemed to support

the award for attorney's fees, and no fact in the record justified
applying that Rule to the plaintiff and not to his attorney, so a
remand on that issue was necessary.
In the instant matter, even though "it is appropriate
[to] affirm if the trial court's decision can be sustained on any
proper legal basis," the task is simpler by reason of the language
of the Order of Dismissal specifying certain bases which the trial
court had in mind in granting the dismissal with prejudice.
As indicated in that Order, the dismissal was grounded
in Rules 4 and 41 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and in addition,
upon the equitable principle of laches.
This specification by the trial court of its grounds
would appear to qualify as "a brief written statement of the
ground for its decision."

However, plaintiff has argued that

this written statement contained in the Order is less than what is
required by Rule 52. Even if plaintiff were correct in its view
that the statement of grounds is more cryptic than envisioned by
the drafters of Rule 52, that rule only requires such a statement
on motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59.
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss was not necessarily granted under
one of those enumerated rules.

In fact, this list omits the two

rules specified by the trial court.
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THERE ARE NO MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT
Plaintiff has claimed that numerous "facts" have been
overlooked or misapprehended by this Court in upholding the ruling
of the trial court. As these are examined, it can be seen that
each claimed fact is irrelevant to the Court's decision and/or has
no evidence to support it.
It is logical to assume that the trial court used as the
factual basis for its decision the verified Statement of Facts
contained in the defendant's Statement of Points and Authorities
in Support of Motion to Dismiss dated February 1, 1989, which
document was attached to the Motion for Summary Affirmance dated
April 20, 1989 and filed herein.
A review of that Statement of Facts shows that they are
uncontroverted.

The closest that defendant comes to a dispute of

these facts is contained in the last two lines of page 7 of its
Statement of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Motion to
Dismiss dated February 16, 1989, which document was attached to
the Response to Motion for Summary Affirmance dated April 24,
1989:

"She claims that she was unaware that she owed plaintiff

any money. Horsefeathers."
The Supreme Court in Massey v. Utah Power & Light, 609
P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1980) stated that "bare contentions, unsupported
by any specification of facts in support thereof, raise no material
questions of fact as will preclude the entry of summary judgment."
In Reeves v. Geigy Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764 P.2d 636
(Utah App. 1988), cited by plaintiff, this Court stated that it
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takes a "sworn statement to dispute the averments on the other
side of the controversy and create such an issue [a genuine issue
of material fact]." Ld. at 640.

The Court noted that the appellant

had "not pointed to any sworn evidentiary material in the record"
(Id. at 642) creating a dispute regarding essential elements of
appellant's seventh cause of action.

Therefore, the summary

judgment against appellant on that cause was upheld.
Plaintiff has expressed concern over omission by the
Court's Memorandum Decision of the following facts:
1.

Plaintiff filed an action in 1978 which was deemed

dismissed under Rule 4(b) when no defendant was served within one
year.
2.

Details of other efforts of plaintiff.

3.

Specification that the divorce of the defendants occurred

after their move from Utah.
4.

Specification that service of summons on defendant

was by means of acceptance of service by counsel.
5.

Defendant moved for summary disposition on appeal.

6.

Plaintiff followed the procedure required by Rule 71B.

7.

Plaintiff claimed before the trial court that Rule

71B applied.
Even assuming that these numbered facts are accurate and
supported by the record, which some are and all may be, in the
case of each such numbered fact (a) its omission does not show
its misapprehension by the Court, (b) it is irrelevant to the
reasoning of the decision, and/or (c) alternative grounds contained
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in the decision still justify exactly the same result.
The only facts which might possibly reach the level
of causing an altering of the reasoning of the Memorandum Decision
would be numbers 6 and 7 regarding Rule 71B.
In its Statement of Points and Authorities in Opposition
to Motion to Dismiss dated February 16, 1989, plaintiff argued
that Rule 71B applied.
Defendant's counsel received a letter dated May 23,
1988, from plaintiff's counsel:
Enclosed is a Rule 71B affidavit to be
filed in the above entitled matter. As you
will recall, we discussed the methodology of
fully complying with the provisions of Rule
71B, and we agreed that if I would prepare and
file an affidavit we would consider Rule 71B
to have been fully complied with. Your agreement
does not prejudice your right to challenge the
applicability of the Rule, but simply agrees
that we need not start over, and that you will
not challenge the Rule for technical reasons.
Such an affidavit may have been executed and filed. As
can be seen, defendant's counsel attempted to assist plaintiff
in matters such as the service of process in order to save the
parties additional expense and delay which seemed to serve no
useful purpose. The defendant desired an expeditious final and
complete resolution of this action.
RULE 71B DOES NOT JUSTIFY REVERSAL
Rule 4(b) states that summons must be served within one
year from the date the complaint is filed.

It states that when

there are more than one defendant, once one defendant has been
served any others may be served at any time before trial.
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Rule 4(b) does not clarify the procedure where one defendant
has been served and trial held and another defendant may be served
before the expiration of one year.

That situation is covered by

Rule 71B.
Plaintiff has argued that even though the one year
expired long ago, Rule 71B nevertheless applies.

It argues that

even though Rule 4(b) provides for only one exception to the deemed
dismissal for failure to serve a defendant within one year, and
even though Rule 71B does not even refer to the Rule 4(b) dismissal,
that Rule 71B should be construed to provide another exception.
There is no reason for Rule 71B to be construed to contradict the
plain language of Rule 4(b).
If Rule 71B were to have any effect more than one year
after the filing of the Complaint, it would seem to be only as an
alternative to filing a new action after a dismissal under Rule
4(b), assuming that the said deemed dismissal were construed to be
without prejudice.

Hence it would be subject to the same defenses

as a new action against the remaining defendant or defendants.
These defenses would include those specified by the trial court as
reasons for dismissal with prejudice, namely, the bar resulting
from two prior dismissals in light of Rules 4 and 41, and the
equitable principle of laches.
Thus even if Rule 71B might allow service after one year,
this Court's Memorandum Decision is still certainly accurate in
stating that Rule 71B cannot justify a failure to serve this defendant
for almost seven years, particularly when she had no knowledge of
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any claim or action filed against her.
RULE 41 MANDATES DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE
Plaintiff argues that since the dismissals referred to
above were not technically voluntarily obtained in accordance with
the procedures in Rule 41(a), they do not suffice to bar a subsequent
filing.

Rule 41(a) should not be read so narrowly.
There was no action on the part of the defendant, such

as a motion to quash, in the case of either dismissal.

In each

case, plaintiff filed the action and then did not serve the defendant
within one year nor before trial.

It would be incongrous to

allow the unilateral actions of a plaintiff to result in two
dismissals, both without prejudice, despite the rule that the
second voluntary dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits.
Rule 41 also encompasses, in subdivision (b), dismissal
for failure to prosecute.

As indicated in plaintiff's Motion to

Reconsider; Petition for Rehearing, dated June 14, 1989, dismissal
for failure to prosecute is a variation of the doctrine of laches,
and therefore most of the applicable principles will be discussed
below under Laches.
One argument brought up by plaintiff that apparently
only applies to its failure to prosecute is the argument that
plaintiff's motion to dismiss on that basis came too late.
Plaintiff cannot claim prejudice by any delay or implied
waiver of this basis.

The very first document filed by defendant

in response to the first documents served on her was her Answer
dated February 19, 1988. The Fourth Defense in that Answer was
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"This action should be dismissed with prejudice for failure to
prosecute."
Defendant's delay in bringing a Motion to Dismiss on
this basis was only to allow time for discovery to produce the
facts appropriate for the trial court's consideration in ruling on
such a motion.
In the case of Wilson v. Lambert, 613 P.2d 7(55 (Utah
1980), the same issue was raised.

The action was filed in 1968.

In January of 1978, the trial court sua sponte considered the
question of dismissal for failure to prosecute, but decided to set
the matter for trial. Nine months later, the defendant in that
case filed a motion to dismiss for failure to diligently prosecute,
which was granted.
In upholding the dismissal, the Supreme Court stated:
Plaintiffs argue ... that defendant waived
the right to move for dismissal on the stated
grounds by not doing so at an earlier date.
Rule 4 K b ) sets no deadline for the moving
party to act; indeed, the court retains inherent
power to dismiss an action for failure to
prosecute pursuant to its own motion. It can
hardly be asserted that a defendant must, on
pain of implied waiver, move within a certain
time limit, when the court may issue a dismissal
order without any action whatsoever on the
part of the parties. Ld. at 768.
LACHES FULLY JUSTIFIES THE COURT'S EXERCISE OF DISCRETION
It would seem that the factors to be considered in
applying the principle of laches are the actions of each party
with respect to moving the case forward and the length of time
involved.
Plaintiff complains at what it views as short shrift
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given its list of actions taken to serve the defendant with summons.
It is true that the circumstances of each case and the actions of
each party should be examined, but that does not mean that the
"due diligence" of the plaintiff must only be evaluated by a
subjective standard.
Looking at the delay objectively, absolutely nothing
took place in the case as to this defendant from the time it was
filed in 1981 until she was served in 1988.
As it states in 24 AmJur 2d Dismissal Sect. 50 at 42,
"plaintiff's obligation is satisfied by a showing of progress"
[emphasis added].

There is no showing of progress with respect to

any defendant after 1981 until the 1988 acceptance of service.
Another way of measuring the efforts objectively is to
compare their results to the results obtained for a $25 initial
investment in November of 1987, several months after plaintiff had
abandoned its efforts to locate the defendant.

That expenditure

resulted in someone new examining the facts and locating the
defendant by the following month.
Even if that is not a fair comparison due to better
technology becoming available, a case should not be able to be
resurrected indefinitely as new technology is developed.

The

basis for statutes of limitation and laches is that after a certain
stated or equitable period of time a person should be free from
having to defend against a stale claim.
Perhaps the years of delay and the absence of successful
action by the plaintiff might be mitigated somewhat if defendant had
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unclean hands or tried to impede or thwart plaintiff's efforts to
move this case forward, but such was not the case.
Plaintiff tries to use innuendo and accusations and
criticism to paint the defendant as a person who knew she owed the
plaintiff money and purposefully violated her contract and tried
to hide and evade.

But the facts and reason show just the opposite.

The verified facts are that the defendant moved from
this state in 1977 under the impression that the debts owed,
including the debt to plaintiff, were paid.

They had sold their

home in Utah for a good profit, and she assumed her husband, who
handled the finances, had paid their debts.

She and her husband

separated in about 1980 and within a few months they were divorced.
He has not paid any support for their child since then.

Defendant

has of course had to personally handle the family finances since
then and has openly sought and obtained credit in her married name
for consumer items.

She was unaware until 1987 that plaintiff

claimed a balance was still owing.
In contrast to these plain, simple, understandable, and
reasonable facts sworn to on the record, plaintiff condemns the
defendant for (a) moving from the state of Utah without notice to
plaintiff, (b) taking the piano from the state in violation of the
agreement, (c) never contacting the plaintiff to see what if any
amount was owed, (d) moving without leaving precise forwarding
addresses, (e) not informing plaintiff of the divorce decree
provisions, (f) residing outside the state of Utah without trying
to contact or pay plaintiff what she knew to have been owing at
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one time, (g) demonstrating no hardship by reason of the delay
(other than a ten-fold increase in the amount claimed that anyone
would have to defend).
Even if defendant had known that any debt to plaintiff
was still unpaid/ these actions would certainly not rise to the
level of unclean hands or otherwise prevent the court from doing
equity.

For example, it would seem unlikely that a wife who

relied on her husband in financial matters and signed with him on
a purchase agreement would read or remember the provision in small
print requiring her to get permission before moving their piano to
a new address. And if she did remember, it would be unlikely for
her to really believe she had to personally take care of that
before they could move.
Once such facts and arguments were presented, the trial
court employed its discretion in dismissing on the basis of laches.
No exact rule can be laid down as to when a
court is justified in dismissing a case for
the plaintiff's failure to prosecute or for
delay in prosecuting his action; each case
must be looked at with regard to its own
peculiar procedural history and the situation
at the time of dismissal. The question of
laches ordinarily depends on whether, under
the facts and circumstances of the particular
case, the plaintiff is chargeable with want of
due diligence in failing to proceed with
reasonable promptness. The question is addressed
to the sound judicial discretion of the trial
court, whose ruling will not be disturbed on
review in the absence of anything to indicate
abuse of discretion in this respect. 24 AmJur
Dismissal Sect. 50 at 40-41.
[T]he trial court may dismiss an action where
there has been a failure, for an unreasonable
period of time after the filing of the complaint,
to have the summons issued ....
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Dismissal or discontinuance of an action
for delay in the issuance or service of summons
[not based on statute or rules of court] is a
matter committed to the trial courtfs discretion.
24 AmJur Dismissal Sect. 51 at 42-43.
This general rule has been specifically endorsed and
applied in Utah:
Pursuant to this rule [41(b)], it is held, in
both state and federal practice, that the
disposition of a motion to dismiss for failure
to prosecute rests with the sound discretion
of the trial court, and that a ruling will not
be upset absent a showing of abuse of that
discretion. Wilson v. Lambert, 613 P.2d 765,
767 (Utah 1980).
As to the standard for determining an abuse of discretion,
the general rule is that the appellate Court presumes that the
discretion was properly exercised unless the record clearly shows
the contrary.

Donohue v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 748

P.2d 1067 (1987).
When plaintiff's counsel indicated the possibility of
appealing this matter, it was brought to his attention that a
basis for the ruling was laches, and an abuse of discretion would
have to be shown.

Nevertheless this costly appeal was instituted.

This Court was absolutely correct in ruling that the
issue herein is straightforward; the appeal is wholly without
merit, if not frivolous; the trial court's exercise of its discretion
was clearly not abusive; summary affirmance is entirely justified;
and double costs are appropriately assessed against the plaintiff
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and appellant.
DATED this 3 0"

day of
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, 1989.
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LYNN P. HEWARD
Attorney for Defendant and Respondent
Sandra G. Williams
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